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Learning objectives 
• To learn about the role of insecure attachment in paranoia.  
• To learn about the use of experiments to induce paranoia and test models of paranoia. 
• To learn about the use of secure attachment primes in buffering distress.  
• To increase awareness of the possibility that asking people with insecure attachment 
styles to think about images of secure attachment figures may increase distress.   
 
Abstract: 
Attachment theory may develop understanding of the occurrence and maintenance of 
persecutory delusions. This study investigates the role of dispositional attachment and 
contextually primed secure-base attachment representations in the occurrence of paranoid 
thinking. Sixty participants were randomly allocated to one of three conditions; a secure 
attachment priming condition, a positive affect condition or a neutral control condition. 
Following priming, all participants were exposed to a paranoia induction. State paranoia was 
measured at baseline and following the paranoia induction. Dispositional insecure attachment 
was associated with both trait and state paranoid thinking. Contrary to predictions, the secure 
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attachment prime did not appear to buffer paranoid thinking and had a negative impact for 
participants with high levels of attachment anxiety, highlighting the potentially aversive 
effects of exposure to secure attachment material in those with existing insecure attachment 
styles.  
Key words: Paranoia; Attachment; Persecutory delusions; Priming  
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Introduction 
The term paranoia describes thinking of a persecutory nature in which a person may believe 
themselves to be under serious and intentional threat of harm from others (Freeman & Garety, 
2000). Continuum models of psychosis (van Os et al., 2000) suggest that paranoid thinking is 
not unique to those meeting criteria for serious mental health conditions, but can be 
experienced in varying levels of severity in the general population. Research using 
nonclinical samples (e.g. Ellett et al., 2003) has helped to develop understanding of the 
processes and mechanisms underlying clinical paranoia. Over the past decade, experimental 
paradigms to assess paranoid thinking have been developed. These have allowed for more 
stringent tests of models of paranoia including the investigation of possible mediating and 
moderating factors of paranoid thinking (e.g. Ellett & Chadwick, 2007; Lincoln et al., 2010).  
Attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969) provides an important theoretical framework for 
understanding psychosis, and may be particularly relevant to understanding paranoia (Berry 
et al., 2007; Wickham et al., 2015).  The theory emphasises the significance of positive early 
experiences with primary caregivers in the development of affect regulation, and beliefs 
about the self and others, that guide interpersonal experiences throughout the lifespan.  
Insecure attachment develops as a result of unresponsive or inconsistent early caregiving 
experience (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2012). Insecure attachment is hypothesised to operate 
along two dimensions, anxious and avoidant. Anxious attachment is typified by a 
preoccupation with establishing and maintaining interpersonal relationships, in the context of 
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being fearful of rejection, whereas avoidant attachment is associated with fear and distrust of 
others and the avoidance of interpersonal relationships (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2012). Both 
anxious and avoidant attachment have been found to be associated with paranoid thinking in 
clinical (Berry et al., 2008; Wickham et al., 2015) and nonclinical (Berry et al., 2006; 
Pickering et al., 2008) samples.  There is also evidence to suggest that insecure attachment 
mediates the relationship between childhood adversity and paranoia (Sitko et al., 2014).  
A number of studies demonstrate the positive effects of priming secure-base representations. 
For example, asking people to imagine an accepting and loving other increases empathic 
responses to others (Mikulincer et al., 2001a) and decreases negative response to 
psychological pain (Cassidy et al., 2009).  The effect of secure base priming and the 
interaction between dispositional attachment and secure base priming is yet to be examined in 
relation to paranoid cognitions. 
This study’s novel contribution to the literature is to merge two previously separate foci of 
investigation: (1) paranoia and attachment styles; and (2) induction of paranoid thinking in 
college students. Exploring the effect of attachment style and attachment primes on paranoia 
induction will test theoretical models of attachment and paranoia and also assess the potential 
role of secure primes in reducing paranoia. Although the role of attachment styles in paranoia 
has been investigated, these findings are largely correlational. In this paper we present the 
first known study to experimentally test the relationship between paranoia and attachment. 
We will use attachment imagery to moderate paranoia induction and as such provide an 
analogue of the potential role of insecure attachment styles in increasing vulnerability to the 
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development of paranoia and to the potential role of secure attachment imagery in alleviating 
feelings of paranoia. 
The following hypotheses were tested: (1) dispositional attachment insecurity would be 
positively associated with state and trait paranoia; (2) exposure to a secure attachment prime 
would result in attenuated reactivity in paranoid thoughts following a paranoia induction; (3) 
dispositional insecure attachment would predict greater reactivity of paranoid thoughts 
following the paranoia induction; and (4) dispositional attachment and secure base priming 
would interact to predict paranoid responding, specifically that the buffering effects of the 
secure prime will be lower in people with high levels of insecure attachment.   
Method 
Participants 
Sixty participants were recruited from a UK university via posters and adverts on the internet 
advertising a study investigating the effect of mood on task performance. The sample were 
18-35 years old (mean = 21, (SD) = 3.5) and 80% were female.  
Measures and manipulations 
 Paranoia and Depression Scale (PDS; Bodner & Mikulincer, 1998) is a state 
measure of depression and paranoia with a 6-point scale (1 - not at all to 6 - very often). Only 
the seven paranoia items were measured at baseline as most depression items relate directly 
to task performance. Both depression and paranoia items were administered following the 
paranoia induction. These subscales have shown good discriminant and convergent validity 
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and internal consistency (Bodner & Mikulincer, 1998). In the current study, Cronbach’s 
alphas for the paranoia (α=.79) and depressive (α=.87) subscales. 
Paranoia Scale (PS; Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) is a measure assessing trait levels 
of paranoia with a 5-point scale (1 = Not at all applicable to me, 5 = extremely applicable to 
me). The measure has been shown to have good internal consistency and test-retest reliability 
in student samples  (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992). For the current sample, Cronbach’s alpha 
was .90.  
 
Experiences in Close Relationships Scale Revised  (ECR-R; Fraley et al., 2000) is a 
self-report scale designed to measure dispositional levels of attachment avoidance and 
attachment anxiety in the context of attachment relationships in adulthood. Participants rate 
how much they agree with each item on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly agree, 7 = strongly 
disagree).  Low scores on each dimension represent more secure attachment. The measure 
has been shown to have good test-retest reliability and convergent validity (Sibley et al., 
2005).  Cronbach’s alphas were .93 for anxious attachment and 0.95 for attachment 
avoidance.  
Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) assesses 
symptoms of depression, anxiety and stress over the last week. Depression items were used in 
this study to assess group equivalence at baseline. Items are rated using a 4-point Likert scale 
of frequency or severity. Good discriminant and concurrent validity (Antony et al., 1998) and 
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internal consistency values have been reported in normative samples. In the current sample, 
the Cronbach’s alpha for the depression subscale was 0.91. 
Attachment priming and control tasks  
Guided imagery is a well-established attachment priming methodology demonstrating 
moderate to large effect sizes (Mikulincer, et al., 2011). This methodology has been used in a 
range of attachment priming studies (Mikulincer & Arad, 1999; Mikulincer, et al., 2001a; 
Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001; Mikulincer et al., 2005; Mikulincer, et al., 2011). In addition to 
the attachment prime, two control conditions were included consisting of a neutral and 
positive affect prime (see Appendix for scripts used). All Scripts were based on those used in 
previous research (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001). Secure attachment is thought to have a 
positive affective component, therefore the latter control condition was included to help 
delineate the impact of this from the broader activation of secure base representations, 
thought to be associated with attachment priming.  All three conditions made reference to 
other people and the only variable that differed in the attachment prime was the 
representation of secure attachment.  An audio recording with prompts was used to guide 
participants through the task which lasted for two minutes.  Following exposure to the prime, 
participants rated current affect across four domains (good, bad, happy, sad) on a 7-point 
Likert scale. After reversing positive domain scores, a total mean affect score, ranging from 1 
– 7, was calculated (Mikulincer, et al., 2001b). The methodology was piloted in a small 
sample (N = 3) with the primary aim being to practice and refine the experimental 
procedures. Qualitative data indicated that the primes were operating in line with priming 
expectations. 
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Paranoia induction  
An established paranoia induction paradigm was used with previously reported large 
effect sizes in non-clinical samples (Ellett & Chadwick, 2007).  Participants completed an 
unsolvable task which involved presenting them with pictures with different dimensions and 
values and asking them to indicate which dimensions contain the correct value.  Participants 
were filmed using a video recorder whilst completing an unsolvable task, with their recorded 
image being clearly visible to them on a monitor screen.   
 
Procedure 
The study had institutional ethical approval from the University of Manchester Ethics 
Committee and all participants gave written informed consent.  The experiment was 
conducted by JH who was blind to priming group allocation.  Participants were randomised 
to one of the three priming conditions using a computer-based random number generator, 
resulting in 20 participants per condition.  One participant was excluded from the attachment 
prime group due to language difficulties.  
Following administration of baseline measures (PDS paranoia items, PS, ECR-R and 
DASS), participants completed one of the three guided imagery primes followed by the post-
prime affect ratings.  Participants then underwent the paranoia induction, following which the 
PDS (paranoia and depression items) and ECR-R were completed.  
Distress protocol  
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As part of the consent procedures, participants were advised that;  ‘Part of the study involves 
inducing a negative mood state, however the effects of this are expected to be short lived. 
Other studies using very similar techniques are not known to have caused any lasting effects 
in participants.  You can stop the study at any time should you feel upset.’  Following the 
experiments, the researcher asked whether participants felt distressed by any portion of the 
study and were offered a positive mood induction task. Participants were also given the 
contact details of the department, researcher, their GP and/or University counselling service.  
 
Data analysis 
Pearson’s correlations were used to test for associations between dispositional attachment and 
measures of paranoia (Hypothesis 1). To investigate whether the primes buffered the effects 
of the paranoia induction (Hypothesis 2), a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
conducted, with Time 2 state paranoia scores as the dependent variable and induction type 
(secure attachment prime, positive affect prime and neutral prime) as the between-subjects 
factor.  A hierarchical regression was used to test the hypotheses that attachment insecurity 
would be independently associated with post-manipulation levels of paranoia (Hypothesis 3) 
and that there would be an interaction between dispositional attachment and the attachment 
prime (Hypothesis 4).  To reduce possible effects of multicollinearity, scores for continuous 
predictors were centred around their respective means and key assumptions of regression 
analysis were checked before conducting the analysis (Osborne & Waters, 2002).  Two 
dummy variables representing the three priming conditions were created, one contrasting the 
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attachment prime to the two control conditions (dummy variable 1) and the other contrasting 
the positive affect prime to the other conditions (dummy variable 2). In the first step of the 
regression, the two dummy variables and the mean centred attachment variables (anxiety and 
avoidance) were entered as predictors, with Time 2 state paranoia scores as the dependent 
variable. In the second step, product terms representing interactions between group and both 
attachment anxiety and attachment avoidance were entered into the model.  
Results 
Sample characteristics and group comparisons 
The three groups did not differ significantly in terms of sample characteristics or 
study measures (see Table 1). The groups also did not differ in terms of post-prime affect 
scores, suggesting that at a group level the prime did not have a differential impact on affect 
across the priming conditions.  
Associations between dispositional attachment and paranoia (Hypothesis 1) 
Correlational analyses (Table 2) showed trait paranoia was positively correlated with 
baseline measures of attachment anxiety and avoidance.  Baseline state paranoia was 
positively correlated with both baseline and post-prime measures of attachment anxiety and 
attachment avoidance. . State paranoia at time 2 was significantly correlated with attachment 
anxiety at Time 2.   
Effect of attachment prime on paranoia (Hypothesis 2) 
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There was no difference in state paranoia scores at Time 2 between the three priming 
groups (see Table 1), indicating that the primes did not differentially impact participants’ 
responses to the paranoia induction.  Given that depressed mood co-occurs with paranoia, and 
may legitimately be induced by failure feedback, we also assessed group differences in state 
depression at Time 2.   No effect of group on state depression was found (see Table 1).  
Effects of dispositional attachment style on post-manipulation paranoia (Hypotheses 3 and 4) 
The regression model is summarised in Table 3.  The first step of the model 
approached significance, with attachment anxiety observed to be the only significant 
predictor of state paranoia at Time 2 in the model, providing initial support for the role of 
insecure attachment in response to the paranoia induction task (Hypothesis 3). 
In step 2, the model was significant at the p < .05 level and explained 27% (R2 = .27, 
95% confidence interval [CI]: .10 - .43) of the variance, which corresponds to a medium 
effect size (Ferguson, 2009).  Although attachment anxiety no longer made a significant 
independent contribution to the model, a significant interaction between attachment anxiety 
and group was observed.  Taken together, this suggests the association between attachment 
anxiety and post-manipulation paranoia was better accounted for by an interaction between 
attachment anxiety and the secure attachment prime, providing support for Hypothesis 4.  
Simple slope tests suggested that higher levels of paranoia were observed in those who 
received the secure attachment prime, but only for those with high levels of dispositional 
attachment anxiety (see Figure 1). 
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The regression reported above refers to findings related to the second administration 
of the attachment measure. When the regression was conducted using the baseline measure of 
global attachment, the interactions between global attachment and group were not significant.  
 
Discussion 
This study investigated the role of dispositional attachment and contextually primed secure-
base attachment representations in the occurrence of paranoid thinking in a nonclinical 
student sample. There was some evidence of associations between dispositional insecure 
attachment and paranoid thinking. However, the secure attachment prime did not appear to 
buffer paranoid thinking and had a negative impact for participants with high levels of 
attachment anxiety. The fact that we found an interaction effect for attachment anxiety and 
not attachment avoidance may be explained by the possibility that people with higher levels 
of avoidant attachment are more effective in supressing negative affect including any 
negative affect associated with the secure attachment prime. Associations between 
dispositional insecure attachment and paranoia support existing literature highlighting the 
role of insecure attachment in the development of paranoia.  
Although the predicted buffering effects of the secure attachment prime were not observed 
(the potential reasons for this are considered further below), exposure to the secure base 
prime was found to predict paranoid thinking in those with high level of dispositional 
attachment anxiety.  This was not observed in those with high level of attachment avoidance.  
While this finding should be viewed with caution, it is has a number of theoretical and 
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clinical implications.  Attachment anxiety was more consistently and strongly correlated with 
both state and trait paranoia than was attachment avoidance, in line  with findings reported by 
Berry and colleagues (Berry, et al., 2006), who also used a nonclinical sample.   
Attachment anxiety is associated with hypervigilance for interpersonally threatening 
information, which may leave people more vulnerable to paranoid thinking (Ein-Dor et al., 
2010).  Attachment avoidance was less strongly and consistently associated with state and 
trait paranoia in the present study. In contrast, associations between these variables have been 
reported in clinical samples (Berry, et al., 2008). Attachment avoidance is characterised by 
withdrawal from social relationships and lack of disclosure of thoughts and feelings to others. 
In the context of psychosis, these coping strategies may reinforce paranoid thinking. 
However, in nonclinical populations, such strategies may be less extreme and thus have a less 
significant impact on paranoia (Ein-Dor, et al., 2010).   
tThe predicted buffering effects of the secure attachment prime were not supported as 
paranoia did not vary as a function of prime type. It does, however, seem premature to reject 
the possible buffering effects of the secure prime, as there are several alternative explanations 
that could account for this null finding.  While the reduction of paranoia from Time 1 to Time 
2 may suggest that the paranoia induction was not successful, this seems unlikely given that 
(a) the induction used is an established paradigm, which has been shown to induce paranoia 
in a number of studies (Bodner & Mikulincer, 1998; Ellett & Chadwick, 2007; Flower et al., 
2013; Kingston & Ellett, 2014), and (b) data from the current study showing a significant 
interaction of dispositional attachment and secure base priming predicting paranoid 
responding. Another possibility is that state paranoia reduced as the experiment progressed; a 
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subsequent re-activation of paranoia following the induction paradigm may have been 
masked by initially elevated baseline levels. This hypothesis is in line with findings reported 
by Kingston and Ellett (2014), who measured paranoia at three time points within their 
experiment.  The lack of a post-prime measure of state paranoia in the current study makes it 
difficult to separate out the effects of the primes and the paranoia induction.  
          Despite the absence of buffering effects, the findings from the current study show 
empirically for the first time, associations between dispositional attachment and (post 
manipulation) state paranoia.  Attachment anxiety predicted greater reactivity of paranoid 
thoughts following the paranoia induction.  Interestingly, higher levels of paranoia were 
observed in those who received the secure attachment prime, but only amongst those 
participants with high levels of dispositional attachment anxiety. The latter is consistent with 
the findings reported by Mikulincer and colleagues (2011), who demonstrated that the 
positive effects of a guided imagery prime were not observed in people with high 
dispositional attachment anxiety. It was suggested that the overt processing of attachment-
related material may have detrimental effects in those with high levels of attachment anxiety, 
potentially via the activation of negative attachment experiences. Indeed, this is consistent 
with qualitative statements reported by participants in the current study, in that a number 
reported feeling ‘distressed’, ‘upset’ or ‘hopeless’ following the secure prime. These findings 
also fit with the concept of a ‘fear of compassion’ (Gilbert et al., 2011), which involves 
experiencing negative responses to compassion received both from others and the self and 
has been associated with insecure attachment (Gilbert et al., 2012).  Future research might 
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usefully examine interactions between insecure attachment style, fear of compassion, and 
paranoia. 
           The findings that dispositional insecure attachments can increase distress in response 
to secure attachment primes highlight the importance of always assessing dispositional 
attachments in such research and routinely assessing interactions effects. The possibility 
that those with insecure attachment may react negatively to secure attachment primes also 
has clear ethical implications for research in this area and highlights the need for 
appropriately sensitive distress protocols in attachment priming research. The finding also 
has particularly important implications in the context of clinical work, suggesting that 
clinicians should always use a formulation-based approach when using secure attachment 
imagery which takes into account the individual person’s attachment history. Although this 
idea makes intuitive sense, our study provides empirical evidence that applying imagery 
strategies without such individualised conceptualisations may increase distress.  
Due to different views within the attachment priming literature regarding when to 
measure dispositional attachment (Cassidy, et al., 2009; Mikulincer, et al., 2001a), the ECR-
R measure was administered at two time points, baseline (Time 1) and following the paranoia 
induction (Time 2). Given the reported stability of the ECR-R (Lopez & Gormley, 2002), 
both administrations were expected to result in comparable findings.  However, examination 
of the data suggested that total attachment scores were higher at Time 1 (M = 2.86, SD = 
1.01) than at Time 2 (M = 2.71, SD = 1.09). This was an interesting and unexpected finding 
and raises the exciting possibility that self-reported attachment patterns might be amenable to 
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experimental manipulation.   A related issue is that the interaction between group and 
dispositional attachment was significant only with Time 2 attachment scores, and not with 
Time 1 attachment scores. It seems unlikely that the second administration of the measure 
was affected by the attachment prime as no significant group differences were observed. 
Alternatively, the differing context of the administration at the two time points in the 
experiment may explain the discrepant findings.  In particular, exposure to threat is thought to 
activate attachment schemas thus making them more available to conscious processing 
(Mikulince et al., 2003a).  The second administration of the measure in a threat-laden context 
(i.e. after the paranoia induction), could have made the attachment schema more available 
and may therefore provide a more accurate measure of attachment.  On the other hand, the 
elevated state paranoia scores at Time 1 suggest that participants experienced Time 1 as more 
threat laden.  Overall, the apparent fluctuation in self-reported attachment across different 
contexts is an interesting finding and one that warrants further research in studies comparing 
threat-laden versus neutral experimental contexts.  
This study has a number of strengths including the use of well-established priming 
and paranoia induction techniques, the use of randomisation and experimenter-blinding 
procedures, and outcome measures of both depression and paranoia.  There are, however, a 
number of limitations. The lack of a measure of state paranoia following the priming 
conditions meant that we were not able to demonstrate the differential effects of the primes 
and paranoia induction. However, we were able to conclusively demonstrate that participants 
were equivalent at baseline on the key variables measured in the study.   Future experimental 
research might usefully include multiple measures of state paranoia, whilst simultaneously 
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ensuring that analyses are appropriately controlled for repeat testing of variables. 
Additionally, the reliance on a self-report measure of attachment may not adequately tap 
covert attachment dynamics. Future research might consider using subliminal attachment 
primes, alongside both self-report and interview-based measures of attachment, such as the 
Adult Attachment Interview  (George et al., 1985), to provide a more thorough and robust 
assessment of attachment. Finally, the nonclinical nature of the sample limits generalisability 
of findings to clinical populations.  However, when treated with appropriate caution, 
nonclinical samples continue to offer great utility in psychological research.             
Conclusions and clinical implications                           
         Paranoia was associated with levels of insecure attachment, which is consistent with 
previous research and supports the hypothesis that attachment is important in paranoia. This 
study provides important evidence that asking people with an anxious attachment style to 
think about secure attachment experiences has the potential to increase, rather than decrease, 
state paranoia, and potentially has important implications for clinical practice.  In particular, 
it demonstrates the potentially aversive effects of exposure to secure-base material in those 
with elevated levels of attachment anxiety, which could result in people who are high in 
attachment anxiety being vulnerable to guided imagery or other therapeutic interventions 
which attempt to expose them to positive attachments. As such therapists should always 
adopt a formulation-based approach which takes into account the person’s attachment history 
in determining the potential risks of attachment-based imagery.  The findings suggest that this 
might be particularly important in any therapeutic work carried out in the context of paranoia.  
An attachment-informed model of therapy would suggest that therapists may need to work 
19 
 
 
 
additionally hard to develop trusting relationships and a secure therapeutic base with those 
with insecure attachment patterns and associated difficulties in earlier attachment 
relationships. However, the provision of a reliable, sensitive and responsive therapy 
relationship over time may result in the development of a good therapeutic alliance which 
provides a platform to help the person make changes in their lives. In such circumstances the 
relationship with the therapist and associated feelings of security may provide the basis 
coping with difficult feelings or the challenges associated with making changes in behaviour 
(Berry & Danquah, 2016).     
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Appendix 
Secure prime script:  
"Imagine yourself in a problematic situation that you cannot solve on your own, and imagine 
that you are surrounded by people who are sensitive and responsive to your distress, want to 
help you only because they love you, and set aside other activities in order to assist you." 
Neutral Prime Script 
“Imagine yourself going to a supermarket and buying products you need for your house. 
Imagine other persons who are also buying products, talking among themselves about daily 
issues, examining new brands, and comparing different products.” 
Positive Affect Prime Script 
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 “Imagine yourself receiving a notice that you win a large amount of money in the national 
lottery, and imagine other students or colleagues in your class hearing about this notice, 
approaching you, congratulating you, and telling others about your good fortune.” 
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Table 1. Sample characteristics and study measures 
 
Variable Attachment prime 
Mean (SD) 
 
(N = 19) 
Neutral prime 
Mean (SD) 
 
(N = 20) 
Positive affect prime 
Mean (SD) 
 
(N = 20) 
Statistics  
(f / X2 values) 
(df = 2) 
     
Age 22.17 (1.73) 21.37 (1.85) 20.25 (1.85) f = 1.5, p = .23 
Gender (male:female) 5:14 3:17 3:17 X2  = 1.09, p = .58 
Time 1 Paranoia Scale 34.32 (13.80) 36.00 (11.25) 34.65 (11.15) f = 0.24, p = .79 
Time 1 PDS (Paranoia) 18.11 (7.22) 18.5 (6.11) 16 (5.56) f = 0.90, p = .41 
Time 1 Depression (DASS) 6.11 (7.59) 9.6 (8.38) 5.7 (6.72) f = 1.59, p = .21 
Time 1 ECR Avoidance 2.79 (1.25) 2.96 (1.21) 2.66 (1.20) f = 0.301, p = .741 
Time 1 ECR Anxiety 2.79 (1.11) 3.10 (1.08) 2.89 (1.12) f = 0.410, p = .67 
Post Prime Mood 5.16 (1.37) 5.1 (1.42) 4.28 (0.65) f = 1.06, p = .35 
Time 2 PDS (paranoia) 16.89 (6.94) 14.7 (6.44) 14.0 (5.06) f=  1.16, p=.32, 
Time 2 PDS (depression) 23.74 (8.11) 24.8 (9.8) 20.6 (9.21) f= 1.17, p = .33 
Time 2 ECR-R Avoidance 2.60 (1.31) 3.00 (1.31) 2.60 (1.46) f = 0.57, p = .57 
Time 2 ECR-R Anxiety 2.42 (0.90) 2.93 (1.20) 2.69 (1.26) f = 0.97, p = .39 
SD = standard deviation; PDS = Paranoia and Depression Scale; ECR-R = Experiences in Close Relationships Scale Revised.  
DASS = Depression, Anxiety & Stress Scales.
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Table 2.  Correlational analysis:  attachment and paranoia 
 
Variable Time 1 
Attachment 
anxiety 
Time 1 
Attachment 
avoidance 
Time 2 
Attachment 
anxiety 
Time 2 
Attachment 
avoidance 
Trait paranoia 
(PS) 
r = 0.4 
p = .002 
r = 0.27 
p = 0.04 
r = 0.24 
p = .06 
r = 0.17 
p = .19 
 
Time 1 
State paranoia 
(PDS) 
 
r = 0.52 
p = .000 
r = 0.3 
p = .02 
r = 0.46 
p = .000 
r = 0.33 
p = .01 
Time 2 
State paranoia 
(PDS) 
r = 0.23 
p = .08 
r = 0.16 
p = 0.22 
r = 0.28 
p = .029 
r = 0.18 
p = .18 
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Table 3: Summary of hierarchical regression with PDS paranoia (Time 2) as the outcome 
variable 
 
  b SE b Β                    95% CI 
     Lower 
bound 
Upper bound 
Step 1       
 Constant 14.26 1.35  11.56 16.95 
 Dummy Variable 1 3.09 1.94 .24 -0.80 6.88 
 Dummy Variable 2 -0.25 1.90 -.02 -4.05 3.56 
 Attachment anxiety 1.69 0.83 .31* 0.03 3.35 
 Attachment avoidance 0.10 0.69 .02 -1.28 1.49 
Step 2       
 Constant 14.67 1.31  12.03 17.31 
 Dummy Variable 1 3.60 1.90 .27 -0.21 7.41 
 Dummy Variable 2 -0.73 1.84 .06 -4.42 2.96 
 Attachment avoidance 0.31 1.22 .07 -2.15 2.76 
 Attachment anxiety -0.20 1.33 -.04 -2.88 2.48 
 Attachment avoidance X 
Dummy variable 1 
0.08 1.69 .01 -3.32 3.49 
 Attachment anxiety X 
Dummy variable 1 
5.24 2.17 .44* 0.90 9.60 
 Attachment avoidance X 
Dummy variable 2 
-0.74 1.62 -.10 -3.99 2.52 
 Attachment Anxiety X 
Dummy variable 2 
2.11 1.82 .25 -1.54 5.65 
              Note: N = 59; Step 1 R2 = .14 (n.s), for Step 2, R2 = .27, *p < .05. Dummy Variable 1 (attachment 
prime versus neutral & positive affect primes), Dummy variable 2 (positive affect prime versus attachment & 
neutral primes).  
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Figure. 1. Interaction effect of group and attachment anxiety on state paranoia 
 
 
 
Summary 
We investigated how attachment styles interact with secure-base attachment representations 
during an experiment to induce paranoia. We randomly allocated sixty participants to a 
secure attachment priming condition, a positive affect condition or a neutral control 
condition. All participants were then exposed to a paranoia induction. We found that insecure 
attachment style was associated with paranoid thinking. However, unexpectedly the secure 
attachment prime did not appear to buffer paranoid thinking and had a negative impact for 
participants with high levels of attachment anxiety. Our findings suggest that exposing people 
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with insecure attachment styles to secure attachment material could increase rather than 
decrease distress.  
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